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Abstract
A number of projects have been developing security archi-
tectures for Vehicular Communication (VC) systems, with
consensus on utilizing public key cryptography to secure
communications. In spite of their advanced status on many
aspects, none of these projects, to the best of our knowl-
edge, has investigated and addressed the problem of Cer-
tificate Revocation List (CRL) distribution. As the need
to evict compromised, faulty, or illegitimate nodes from the
VC system is commonly accepted, our contribution here is
a solution tailored to the requirements and constraints of
the VC systems. Our design is scalable and efficient, and
can deliver seamlessly CRLs to all nodes within a region
within tenths of minutes. More general, our analysis and
simulation evaluation set the basis for the design of such
CRL distribution systems, showing how to configure them
to achieve more stringent requirements.
1 Introduction
Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure
(V2I) communication will enhance transportation safety
and efficiency. Recently, however, efforts on vehicular
communication (VC) security have been undertaken, as it
has been well-understood that VC systems are vulnerable
to attacks and that the privacy of their users is at stake.
For example, an attacker could inject messages with false
information, or collect vehicle messages to track their
locations and infer sensitive user data. Three major efforts
to design security and privacy enhancing solutions for
VC are currently underway, along with the efforts of the
Car-to-Car Communication Consortium (C2C-CC): the
NoW project [5], the IEEE 1609.2 working group [7], and
the SeVeCom project [10].
A few basic ideas transcend all these VC security architec-
tures: they all build on top of a currently accepted network-
ing protocol stack, with primary security requirements be-
ing message authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation,
as well as protection of private user information. They all
rely on a Certification Authority (CA), and public key cryp-
tography to protect V2V and V2I messages, with each node
(VC-equipped vehicle or RSU) are registered one CA and
can participate in the network operation. Of course, it is
also clear that a node equipped with a certificate is not nec-
essarily complying with the implemented protocols, neither
is it operating correctly (e.g., it may simply inject faulty
data). A line of defense against faulty or compromised
nodes is crucial for the trustworthiness of the VC system.
A well-understood method is to defend the system is to
evict the misbehaving nodes. In the context of current se-
cure VC architectures, revocation of the certificate of such
nodes is an appropriate approach that has been utilized in
other types of systems. Moreover, revocation can be useful
for other reasons; for example, credentials of stolen vehi-
cles can also be revoked. Once revoked, messages from that
nodes will be ignored by system nodes.
The problem of revocation in VC systems has hardly
attracted any attention in the literature, as explained in
Sec. 6: the need for CRL distribution is discussed in [5,7,10],
and aspects of it are addressed in [10, 11]. In all these
documents, the distribution of Certificate Revocation Lists
(CRLs) has a central importance, it is understood that only
the CA can revoke a node (include the node’s certificate in
a CRL), and that renewal of the CRL (with exclusion of
prior and inclusion of new entries) is relatively infrequent.
Distributed mechanisms that allow the identification of mis-
behaving nodes are proposed [11] to bridge this gap un-
til a misbehaving node’s certificate is revoked. Yet, in all
works in the Vehicle Ad Hoc Networking (VANET) litera-
ture on revocation, the distribution of the CRL is the final
and definitive line of defense.
However, none of the above-mentioned prominent efforts
on security for VC, and to the best of our knowledge no
other proposal in the literature, have been concerned with
the fundamental problem of how to distribute the CRL
across a large-scale and multi-domain system as the ve-
hicular communication systems. More important, how to
deliver in a timely manner the appropriate CRL to all vehi-
cles without an omni-present fixed infrastructure, and how
to do so as the number of equipped vehicles will grow? Fur-
thermore, how to ensure that the CRL distribution protocol
will incur low overhead, especially due to the limited band-
width? In this paper, we address exactly these questions.
Our contribution in this paper the first investigation on
the distribution of CRLs in vehicular ad hoc networks. As
alluded in [5, 7, 10], leveraging on fixed infrastructure, al-
beit sparsely connected, is the appropriate choice, and for
this we elect the use of RSUs, as they will in fact be de-
ployed, e.g., in the US by public authorities, as enablers of
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VC systems. But these RSUs will be assigned tasks that are
more time-critical than the CRL distribution (e.g., junction
warnings), and, often, in dense traffic conditions the wire-
less channel will be already congested.
To meet such constraints that are unique to the VC set-
ting, we propose and evaluate here a scheme tailored to
the specific constraints of VANET-enabled systems. We
propose a collaboration scheme between regional CAs that
allows CRLs to contain only regional revocation informa-
tion; a low-rate, randomized method for RSUs to broadcast
the CRL; the use of erasure codes to enhance the robust-
ness and flexibility of the CRL distribution. Our scheme
does not require any communication and cooperation be-
tween RSUs on the CRL distribution task, and minimizes
the CA-RSU and vehicle-CA-RSU interactions. Our results
show that allocating a bandwidth of few KBytes/s to the
CRL distribution broadcast is sufficient for a very high per-
centage of (practically, all) vehicles to receive securely the
complete CRL within minutes.
In the rest of the paper, we provide the system model in
Sec. 2, followed by a more precise problem statement and
solution overview in Sec. 3. The detailed description of our
scheme components is provided in Sec. 4, and an analytical
and simulations-based evaluation of our scheme is given in
Sec. 5. We conclude the paper after a survey of related work
(Sec. 6), and a discussion.
2 System Model
Existing administrative processes run by automotive au-
thorities (e.g., departments of motor vehicles) offer a
paradigm for the organization of the (large number of) Cer-
tification Authorities (CAs) that will be necessary for the
deployment of secure vehicular communication systems. In
accordance with the proposals of the IEEE 1609.2 [7] and
the SeVeCom architecture [10], each CA is responsible for
the identity management of all vehicles registered in its re-
gion (national territory, district, county, etc.). This results
in a forest of hierarchical structures and cross-certification
among high-level CAs. Vehicles registered with different
CAs can thus communicate securely as soon as they vali-
date the certificate of one CAA on the public key of some
CAB . Various procedures for easily obtaining these cross-
certificates can be implemented. Moreover, the deployment
of secure vehicular communications could still be handled
locally, to a great extent, especially as those systems’ pen-
etration increases gradually.
Each node, vehicle or RSU, registered with exactly one
CA, has a unique identity V and a pair of private and public
cryptographic keys, kV and KV , respectively, and obtains a
certificate CertCA{V,KV , AV , T}, with AV is a list of node
attributes and T the certificate lifetime. The CA issues
such certificates for all nodes upon registration, and upon
expiration of the certificate. The CA is also responsible for
evicting nodes from the system, if necessary, either for ad-
ministrative or technical reasons. The interaction of nodes
with the CA does not need to be continuous, and in fact it
cannot be. This is so, because the road-side infrastructure
that acts a gateway for the CA to the vehicular part of the
network will not fully cover the vehicular network area. On
the other hand, other infrastructure-based networks (e.g.,
cellular) that have already broad coverage, cannot be as-
sumed to enable basic security functionality or substitute
for V2I communication. This is primarily due to: the cost
of the cellular links, and the absence of consensus (thus far,
at least) between telecommunication providers and auto-
makers on the convergence of the two industries.
In principle, credentials and cryptographic keys corre-
spond to a long-term identity of the node. Nonetheless,
all three currently available (under development) security
architectures for VC [5,7,10] also propose the use of short-
lived keys and credentials to secure communication. This is
the concept of pseudonymity or pseudonymous authentica-
tion: each vehicle is equipped with multiple certified public
keys (pseudonyms) that do not reveal the vehicle identity,
and the vehicle uses those pseudonyms alternately, each for
a short period of time, so that messages signed under dif-
ferent pseudonyms cannot be linked.
The exact nature and use of certified public keys is largely
orthogonal to the CRL distribution per se. The only dif-
ference would be the size of the CRL: if a revoked vehicle
is equipped with multiple pseudonyms, its eviction would
require the inclusion of all its unexpired pseudonyms to the
CRL. In contrast, the IEEE 1609.2 working group is propos-
ing the use of a large pool pseudonyms that are shared
among vehicles: each vehicle picks a small subset of those
and utilizes them alternately. Typical values for the overall
pool of pseudonyms (key pairs essentially) and chosen sub-
set are PN = 10000 and n = 5 respectively. In the former
case, since neither NoW nor SeVeCom have a recommenda-
tion on the rate of pseudonym change, it is hard to estimate
the number of additional certificates that would need to be
revoked. In the latter case though, each revocation would
require the inclusion of a constant n entries in the CRL. Be-
tween these two extremes, here we simply vary our estimate
of the CRL sizes for our systems, as explained in Sec 5, and
work with the more pessimistic assumption that the CRL
size is proportional to the number of nodes registered with
the CA.
Regarding the communication, we consider the essentially
globally recommended use of a variant of the IEEE 802.11
technology. As the IEEE 802.11p/DSRC radios [1] have not
been extensively evaluated, we consider 802.11a, and chan-
nel models investigated in the literature [12] with typical
communication ranges up to 200m, and the typical commu-
nication patterns, (e.g., 10 beacons per sec per vehicle). In
terms of cryptographic primitives, we consider in this paper
also EC-DSA [2].
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3 Problem Statement and Scheme
Overview
Certificate revocation is deemed necessary in VC to ensure
their trustworthiness, essentially by evicting illegitimate or
faulty nodes or simply preventing the use of compromised
cryptographic material. We do not dwell on the policies
that govern node eviction, and neither the process of col-
lecting evidence that specific credentials must be revoked,
as those can hinge on legal issues and are beyond the scope
of this paper. Rather, our focus is to design a system that
enables the timely distribution of a Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) after its most recent and up-to-date version is
created by the CA. The intended recipients are all nodes
(vehicles) circulating within the region (domain) of a CA.
More precisely, we are interested in designing a system
that upon generation of a new CRL at time t0, the CA will
have the CRL distributed within a delay ∆ to some fraction
x of all nodes that circulated in the domain of the CA for at
least ∆ seconds after t0. The challenge is to design a system
that can push ∆ to low values, and thus timely delivery, and
accordingly push x to 1.
Such values can be system-selectable parameters. but
since this problem has never been addressed before, no-
tably, in the light of its geographical dimension and the
intermittent CA-to-node connectivity, the charting of the
design space and the identification of all the trade-offs and
the investigation of the achieved performance is the first
step towards understanding, for example, which ∆ values
are achievable and for which cost. Nonetheless, there sev-
eral challenges salient to the VC operational environment
that should be addressed. Our design relies on the use of the
roadside infrastructure to disseminate the CRLs, a practi-
cal approach as equipment that will be deployed for VC is
used, without additional cost. The basic idea is to dissem-
inate simultaneously the CRL across the entire CA region,
but in a way that does not degrade VC for other more time-
critical operations (such as safety applications). We outline
next the basic components of our scheme towards achieving
these objectives, and provide additional details in Sec. 4:
Regional CRLs Since the size of a CRL is proportional
to the number of vehicles registered with a CA, it is straight-
forward to maintain a CRL that corresponds only to a spe-
cific regional CA. We denote the most recent, up-to-date
CRL for a given CA as CRLCA. The motivation, stem-
ming from the hierarchical CA structure, is to keep the
CRLs small in size.
CA Collaboration As vehicles travel across geographi-
cal boundaries of CA regions, regional revocation informa-
tion should flow across those boundaries. Thus, CAs ex-
change over the wire-line Internet CRLs. However, they do
not merge those and do not disseminate them in their re-
gio. Rather, we propose that each CA issues and manages
short-lived Foreigner Certificates (FCs) for visiting vehicles
V registered with another CA. If such an FC is revoked, it
is included in the CRLCA as an own certificate. In princi-
ple, only a small fraction of vehicles registered with some
CAA will enter the domain of some CAB , the increase of
the CRLCAB size will be accordingly small and thus keep
the CRL size low.
Multi-RSU CRL Distribution The challenge is to dis-
tribute the CRLCA at any point of the CA region. The
deployment of RSUs, often by the same organization that
instantiates the CA, makes it natural for the CA to lever-
age on them for the CRL distribution. Vehicles are able
to obtain CRLCA from any such RSU, or when needed,
complete the “download” of the CRLCA with the help of
multiple RSUs.
Segmented, Erasure-Coded Protected, Secure
CRLs With an error-prone wireless channel and relatively
low communication ranges in high density situations, and
often low vehicle-RSU contact times due to mobility, it is
highly likely that a CRL download is never be completed.∗
To address this challenge, we propose that:
• The CRLCA is segmented in M CRL pieces, which we
denote by p1, p2, . . . , pM .
• The segmented CRLCA is then encoded by an era-
sure code, which adds limited redundancy and produces
N > M pieces, such that for anyM out of N pieces re-
ceived the original CRLCA can be reconstructed. Each
of the N pieces p1, p2, . . . , pN is transmitted by the
RSUs across the wireless medium.
• The values parametersM andN are chosen to be large,
and more specifically N >> M . Note that erasure
codes are applicable with small N,M and simply N >
M ; for example, [?] can be used to encode a CRLCA
so that any M = 2 out of N = 3 pieces suffice for
reconstruction. However, largeM , and thus small piece
size, along with N >> M increase resilience to errors
(packet loss) and short RSU connection time, as well
as repetitive reception of the same piece by different
RSUs.
• Each CRLCA carries the CRL version identifier and
timestamp, the CA and identifier, the piece sequence
number, and the digital signature σCA of the CA. As a
result, each piece can be validated individually, and an
adversary cannot inject forged or outdated CRL pieces.
As soon as anyM out of N pieces, with their integrity,
freshness, and authenticity validated, are obtained, the
CRLCA is constructed.
∗Maintaining a file pointer and resuming the download when con-
nection to another RSU is established is conceivable. But this would
entail complexity and overhead, due to RSU-to-CA or RSU-to-RSU
communication.
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Minimal RSU-CA and No RSU-RSU Interactions
The CA constructs the CRLCA and forwards all its N
pieces to all the RSUs within its region. This is an one-time
operation within the lifetime of the CRLCA. The RSUs will
distribute the CRL pieces to the wireless part of the secure
VC system, without any modification. Moreover, they do
not request from the CA any service and neither do they
forward any requests from vehicles to the CA related to the
CRL distribution. Similarly, no communication between
RSUs takes place with respect to the CRL distribution.
Randomized, Low-Rate Broadcast Distribution
Each RSU randomly shuﬄes the N pieces of the encoded
CRLCA, and commences their transmission across the wire-
less data link. The transmission is broadcast, without any
acknowledgement from the receiving vehicles. The rate
of broadcast is rB pieces/sec, and it is chosen so that in
bytes/sec the bandwidth (data rate) consumed by CRL
pieces rB << C, with C the bandwidth the data link can
support.
The uncoordinated broadcast is independent of the indi-
vidual vehicle trajectories. With N ,M selected as explained
above, it is unlikely that pieces previously lost (due to mo-
bility or channel errors) or pieces previously received and
validated will be repeatedly lost or received during succes-
sive RSU encounters. The broadcast transmission is ap-
propriate as CRLs are necessary to any vehicle, it allows
the RSU to avoid keeping track of vehicles within range
and their communications, and transfer the state to other
RSUs. The low rate, rB , is chosen so that the CRL distri-
bution does not interfere with the rest of the VC operation.
The lower the rB the more bandwidth available for safety
and traffic efficiency applications traffic, thus the more re-
liable the reception of those time-critical messages.
Overall, a major concern is scalability, achieved by keep-
ing the CRL size low. The simplicity in design, with min-
imal RSU-CA and no RSU-RSU interactions, is a second
critical factor also contributes to scalability: the number
of RSUs can increase to very high numbers, with at most
a linear increase in the CA-RSU communication, the infre-
quent, once per CRL version “push” of the N pieces from
the CA to each RSU across the wireline network. Moreover,
there is no dependence of our CRL distribution scheme on
the number of vehicles in the network, which they will be
in significantly larger in number than RSUs.
4 Scheme Components
4.1 CA Collaboration
Regional CAs collaboration is mainly based on the issu-
ing and management of foreigner certificates (FCs), whose
issuance takes place before a node V ’s entering the host
CAF ’s geographical area. Once in the new area, V utilizes
only the foreigner certificate, which is readily recognizable
as FC by a specific field and thus cannot be used by V to
obtain yet another FC with another CA. We define a for-
eigner certificate {h,Kh, fr}F as a short lived certificate
that CAF issues to a valid vehicle h belonging to region H
and visiting region F . For CAF to consider h as valid, and
to issue it a foreigner certificate, {h,Kh}H should not be
present in the CRL of CAH . h uses it foreigner certificate
to communicate with other vehicles during its journey in
F . In case CAF detects a misbehavior of h, CAF inserts
{h,Kh, fr}F in its CRL and notifies CAH which inserts
{h,Kh}H in its CRL. Therefore, the CRL of any CAX only
contains revoked certificates that CAX issued and foreigner
certificates of vehicles from other regions that misbehaved
during a journey in X.
H, F , G Regions in the system
CAX CA responsible of region X
CARoot The root CA
h A vehicle belonging to region H
{h,Kh}H A regular certificate issued by CAH to h
{h,Kh, fr}F A foreigner certificate issued by CAF to h
CRLX CRL of region X
4.1.1 Foreigner Certificate Delivery Protocol
As a vehicle h enters a foreign region F , it initiates a for-
eigner certificate delivery protocol with CAF in order to
obtain a foreigner certificate. Communication between the
vehicle h and CAF is performed over some RSU in region
F . The vehicle h would also need to initiate the protocol
if it is still in region F when its foreigner certificate ex-
pires. The FC is delivered by the protocol below, for which
the time-stamp in the request is intended to defend against
replay attacks.
vehicle h CAF
{h,current time}kh , {h,Kh}CAH−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
{h,Kh,fr}CAF , {F,KF }CAroot←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− check {h,Kh} /∈ CRLH
{h,current time}kh−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
4.1.2 Revocation of foreigner certificates
Foreign vehicles can misbehave while in the host region,
and there must be a way in this case to revoke their cer-
tificates and to inform other CAs in the system. Typically,
foreign vehicles stay a short period in a host region. There-
fore, their certificates need only to have a relatively short
lifetime, which makes their revocation less challenging.
Implicit revocation One method is implicit revocation.
Here, the lifetime of foreigners certificates is very short e.g.
in the order of one day. If a vehicle is still in a foreign region
when its foreigner certificate expires, it requests a new one.
After running the protocol described above, the vehicle is
issued a new foreigner certificate. If CAF detects that h
is misbehaving, it notifies CAH , which inserts {h,Kh} in
CRLH . This way, it is always enough for CAF , or any
other CAX to check CRLH in order to know about the
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status of a vehicle belonging to region H. CAF could also
insert {h,Kh} in CRLF or simply keep it in a local black
list for its own records. This approach is particularly good
if foreign vehicles generally only transit by the host region.
Explicit revocation Another method is explicit revoca-
tion. Here foreigners certificates lifetime is longer than in
the previous scheme, but still shorter than for normal cer-
tificates. If CAF detects a misbehavior of h, the same steps
are performed as for implicit revocation. Here, however,
CAF will necessarily insert {h,Kh} in CRLF . Moreover,
CAF needs to periodically check that {h,Kh} /∈ CRLH for
the entire lifetime of the foreign certificate of h. This is to
catch a situation in which h goes to its home region H, or
another region G and performs some misbehavior while in
there, and then comes back to region F wishing to use a
still valid foreigner certificate {h,Kh, fr}CAF .
4.2 CRL Construction
CRL Encoding with Erasure Codes The M pieces of
the CRL are encoded into N > M pieces using an Erasure
code. This allows to decrease the probability of reception
of repeating pieces. In Erasure codes, some redundancy
is added to the message, then the message and the redun-
dancy are divided into pieces. The encoding of a message
first segments the original message of length FS into L se-
quence of characters, each of lengthM , with padding if nec-
essary. The segments of the original message are arranged
as columns of a M−by−L array B, to which a linear trans-
formation is applied to get a N−by−L arrayW . The linear
transformation is such that it is possible to reconstruct the
original message, when having any number of rows of W
that is slightly larger than M . The CA encodes the M
pieces of the CRL into N pieces using an Erasure code, and
sends the encoded pieces to the RSUs in its region. A large
N
M would make the probability of reception of a duplicate
piece smaller, but would increase the coding and decoding
complexity.
CRL Encoding with Fountain Codes A fountain code
produces for a given set of k input symbols (x1, · · · , xk) a
potentially limitless stream of output symbols z1, z2, · · · .
Each output symbol is the sum of a randomly and indepen-
dently chosen subset of the input symbols. It is possible to
recover the input symbols with high probability from any
subset of the output symbols that is slightly larger than k.
Universal Raptor codes are a special class of fountain
codes that has liner time encoding and decoding. For a
given set of k input symbols (x1, · · · , xk) and any real ² >
0 a potentially limitless stream of symbols z1, z2, · · · such
that any subset of symbols of size k(1 + ²) is sufficient to
recover the original k symbols with high probability. Each
output symbol is generated using O(log( 1² ) operations, and
the original symbols are recovered from the collected ones
with O(k log(1² )) operations.
5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the differ-
ent CRL distribution schemes introduced in the paper. We
evaluate the resources that need to be allocated for the
CRL distribution for different system parameters in order
for vehicles to receive the entire CRL within a reasonable
amount of time. We mainly consider the size of the CRL,
the range and the density of RSUs, and the penetration ra-
tio of VANET capabilities. Our results show that in most
situations, when using Erasure codes or Fountain codes, al-
locating a bandwidth in the order of 1 kbps is sufficient.
5.1 Analytical evaluation
We first evaluate the expected CRL sizes, and then we com-
pute T the time after which a vehicle completes the recep-
tion of a newly issued CRL while varying the range of RSUs
R, the distance between them D, and the bandwidth allo-
cated to the transmission.
5.1.1 CRL size
Let Neq be the total number of equipped vehicles in the re-
gion that the CRL needs to cover, pr the average proportion
of certificates revoked per time period e.g. day ,and Lf the
life time of a certificate in times periods. Let NCRL be the
number of certificates in the CRL. NCRL is the number of
non expired certificates that were revoked.
The average number of revoked certificate each time pe-
riod is Neq ∗ pr. We assume that a revoked certificate has
en equal probability to become revoked at any time period
of its life time i ∈ {1, . . . , Lf}. When a certificate is re-
voked at time period i of its life time, it will stay in the
CRL for Lf − i time periods. Thus, the expected time a
revoked certificate stays in the CRL is E(Lf − i) = Lf2 .
From the above two equations, the expectation of NCRL
is E(NCRL) = (Neq ∗ pr) ∗ Lf2 . We consider the CRL to
consist of the identifiers of all the revoked certificates plus
a security overhead of 500 Bytes. We expect that 4 Byte
identifiers should be sufficient for vehicles, as this the cur-
rent size of the IP space nowadays. Therefore, the expected
CRL size is E(SCRL) = E(NCRL) ∗ 4Bytes + 1KBytes.
The table in Fig. 1 from the National Insurance Crime Bu-
reau gives numbers about the motor vehicle theft in the top
ten U.S. metropolitan areas in 2005, ranked by the rate of
vehicle theft reported per 100,000 people based on the 2000
Census, and the size of the CRL that would result from
including the identifiers of all these vehicles in the CRL. In
the early deployment phase, only a ratio r < 100% of vehi-
cles will be equipped, and thus the size of the CRL would be
r . E(SCRL). According to FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports,
1, 237, 114 motor vehicles were reported stolen. Inserting
all the identifiers of these vehicles would result of a CRL of
5MBytes. The coordination between regional CAs makes
it possible to distribute regional CRLs, and in this paper
we do not try to distribute a national CRL.
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Metropolitan Area Vehicles stolen Rate CRL size (KBytes
Modesto, CA 7,071 1,418.80 30
Las Vegas/Paradise, NV 22,465 1,360 91
Stockton, CA 7,586 1,167.30 32
Phoenix/Mesa/Scottsdale, AZ 41,000 1,103 165
Visali/Porterville, CA 4,257 1,060 18
Seattle/Tacoma/Bellevue, WA 33,494 1,057 135
Sacramento/Arden-Arcade/Roseville, CA 20,268 82
San Diego/Carlsbad/San Marcos, CA 28,845 983 116
Fresno, CA 8,478 978.11 35
Yakima, WA 2,212 965.54 10
Figure 1: Motor vehicle theft, top ten U.S. metropolitan areas, 2005
5.1.2 Total number of CRL pieces
Let M be the number of pieces in which a CRL is cut. A
vehicle receives a number of pieces P from each RSU it en-
counters. It completes the reception of the CRL with high
probability after it collects a total of Ptot pieces from n con-
secutive RSUs it encounters. Ptot is the main parameters
that changes between schemes.
Scheme without encoding Let random variable X rep-
resent the number of pieces that allowed a vehicle h to
recover its CRL. A 99.99% confidence interval for X is
[E(X)− 3.9√var(X), E(X) + 3.9√var(X)], and therefore
Ptot = E(X)+3.9
√
var(X). For this scheme, counting X is
equivalent to counting the the number of balls that need to
be tossed in order to fill M bins where each ball is equally
likely to fall into any of the M bins and that the tosses are
independent.
Let random variable Xj represent the number of tosses
required to have a ball land in a j + 1th bin once j bins
contain a ball for j = 0, 1, · · · ,M . We have X =∑Mj=1Xj .
After j bins contain a at least a ball each, the proba-
bility that the next ball tossed will fall into a new bin is
M−j
M . Therefore, the random variable Xj has a geometric
distribution
P (Xj = k) =
(
j
M
)k−1
.
M − j
M
The expectation of X is
E(X) =
M∑
j=1
E(Xj)
=
M∑
j=1
M
M − j
= M
M∑
j=1
1
j
The variance of X is
V ar(X) =
M∑
j=1
j
M(
M−j
M
)2
= M
M∑
j=1
j
(M − j)2
Scheme using Erasure codes The analysis is very sim-
ilar to the the one for the scheme without coding, except
that here we count the number of balls that need to be
tossed in order to fill the first M bins out of N bins, where
each ball is equally likely to fall into any of the N bins and
that the tosses are independent. We have
P (Xj = k) =
(
j
N
)k−1
.
N − j
N
The expectation of X is
E(X) =
M∑
j=1
E(Xj)
=
M∑
j=1
N
N − j
The variance of X is
V ar(X) =
M∑
j=1
j
N(
N−j
N
)2
= N
M∑
j=1
j
(N − j)2
Scheme using a Fountain code For the broadcast us-
ing Fountain codes, we simply have Ptot = (1 + ²)M .
Comparison When no encoding is used, Ptot >> M
causing a considerable waste of bandwidth. In figure 2, Ptot
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Figure 2: Number of pieces to be received vs. number of pieces
in the CRL
is depicted for the case when Erasure codes and Fountain
codes are used and for different values of M . Both codes
perform equivalently well achieving Ptot ≈ M . This is due
to the fact that the probability of receiving duplicate pieces
is small for an Erasure code with N >> M . The deci-
sion on which coding scheme to use should be based on the
speed, computation, and memory complexity of the codes.
The existence of patents are another important aspect to
consider. We do not make a distinction between the coding
schemes for further analysis.
5.1.3 Time to complete the CRL
In this section, we compute T the time for a vehi-
cle to complete the reception of a newly issued CRL.
The vehicle drives at velocity v, and encounters con-
secutive RSUs 1, 2, 3, . . . , i, . . . separated by distances
D1, D2, . . . , Di−1, . . . . RSUs have range R and broadcast
CRLs at a bandwidth B. Let pr(d) be the probability of
reception of packets in function of the distance d of the
vehicle from the RSU. If sz is the size of the CRL data con-
tained in each broadcasted CRL packet and oh the size of
overhead to the packet, then the number of pieces received
from one RSU can be found as P = Bsz+oh ∗ RV . The num-
ber of RSUs n a vehicle needs to encounter to complete its
CRL is n = PtotP . The total time to complete the CRL is
therefore
T =
1
V
[
n−1∑
1
Di +R
]
5.2 Simulations
We simulate an urban scenario, in the shape of a grid, but
without the road segments at the perimeter. Essentially, the
grid we utilize has N vertical and N horizontal roads, and
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thus N2 intersections, in the shape of a hash (#). Each
road has two lanes in opposing directions. The distance
between two consecutive horizontal (and two consecutive
vertical) roads is L. The intersections we consider have:
• No Traffic Lights, with vehicles yielding to vehicles ar-
riving from their right†.
• Synchronized Traffic Lights: Intersections are equipped
with synchronized traffic lights, so that the light is
green in the horizontal direction at all intersections at
the same time.
Vehicles enter the simulated area from all 4N end-points
of the grid. We experiment with the rate of car entry, f ,
to increase the vehicle traffic congestion level and thus the
mobility of vehicles. The entrance of new vehicles is ran-
domized but the aggregate results in an in-flow of f vehi-
cles/hour/lane. The vehicles select a destination when they
†The default rule in Europe, which differs from the “four way stop”
rule used in the United States
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Figure 5: Time vs. range of RSUs, traffic lights
enter the network, choosing uniformly randomly their des-
tination among the N road end points at the opposite side
of the road network. For realistic vehicle mobility, we use
SUMO [4], a microscopic, continuous-space and discrete-
time traffic simulator.‡ The parameters we use are summa-
rized in the Table 1. We clarify that for each value of f ,
as it increases, we get a different level of average car den-
sity, which we denote in our results presentation as “density
level.”
Table 1: Simulation parameters
Simulation duration 1000sec
Grid dimension (N) 5, 10
Number of lanes per road 2
Road segment length L 600 m
In-flow rate (f) 100..400 Vehicles/h/lane
Connectivity range r [m] 50 to 200
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Effect of the range of RSUs
The time to complete the CRL is inversely proportional to
the range of RSUs (Figs. 5, 6). When the range of RSUs is
large, a vehicle has a large contact time with each RSU, and
thus gets a bigger chunk of the CRL from each RSU. The
vehicle can then complete the entire CRL after meeting few
RSUs. In the situation where there are traffic lights, larger
ranges do not cause the total time to decrease further as the
traffic lights already cause vehicles to spend considerable
time within the range of each RSU.
‡SUMO implements a “car following” model and dynamically iden-
tifies routes to take based on the route length and the average achiev-
able velocity.
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Figure 10: Time vs. broadcast bandwidth, R = 200 m
5.3.2 Effect of the distance between RSUs
The time to complete the CRL increases linearly with the
distance D between RSUs (Fig. 4). As this distance in-
creases, a vehicle needs more time until it encounters the
number of RSUs required to complete the CRL. The dis-
tance D reflects the deployment density of RSUs. In the
early phase of deployment, it is expected that RSUs would
be sparse, and thus the distance D would be large. How-
ever, at that stage, the number of equipped vehicles would
be small, and thus a small number of vehicles would need
to be revoked, limiting the size of CRLs.
5.3.3 Effect of the density of vehicles
When the density of vehicles is large on the roads, con-
gestion occurs and vehicles move slowly. This affects the
total time to complete the CRL in two manners. In the
first, a vehicle have a larger contact time with each RSU
as it needs more time to traverse the range, and thus only
needs to encounter fewer RSUs. In the second, now a ve-
hicle needs more time to traverse the distance outside the
range of RSUs, and that it takes it longer to encounter the
required number of RSUs. From Figs. 7, 8), it can be seen
that when the range of RSUs is large, the two effects cancel
each others. However, congestion causes the total time to
increase when the ranges are small.
5.3.4 Effect of the broadcast bandwidth
Allocating more bandwidth to the CRL broadcast sig-
nificantly decreases the total time to complete the CRL
(Figs. 3, 9, and 10). A vehicle only needs to encounter few
RSUs, as it receives a big CRL chunk from each one of
them. However, this effect saturates after some point, and
to decrease the total time further, there is a need to change
the other parameters, such as the range of RSUs, or the
distance between them.
6 Related Work
The concept of revocation, especially in connection with
public key cryptography, and the use of certificate revo-
cation lists was introduced in the context of the wire-line
Internet. In fact, CRLs are the standard method for re-
vocation in the Internet [6]. A CRL is issued each revoca-
tion period, e.g., once a month. ∆−CRLs were proposed
to avoid large size CRLs, providing information relative to
the last issued CRL. This means that a ∆−CRL is useful
only if the full CRL was already received. But this is not
a desirable option for the error-prone, highly volatile, often
disconnected VC environment.
In the context of VC, there are only a few proposals on
how to revoke certificates and evict nodes. Two protocols
are proposed in [11] to evict nodes: The Revocation of the
Trusted Component (RTC) and the Revocation with Com-
pressed Certificate Revocation Lists (RC2RL) protocols.
RTC instructs, via the RSU infrastructure, the trusted com-
ponent on-board the vehicle to “self-destruct,” i.e., erase its
own private key. But it requires the CA, however, to be able
to geographically localize any vehicle in the system, while a
sophisticated adversary could always control the communi-
cation between the radio and the on-board computing plat-
form. On the other hand, RC2RL is a CRL-based revoca-
tion that compresses traditional CRLs using Bloom filters,
and thus limits the size of the CRL. Since Bloom filters have
false positives, some legitimate certificates that are not part
of the (compressed) CRL, that is, the filter, can get revoked
as well. Nonetheless, legitimate users would be unhappy to
have their credentials revoked and thus have their vehicles
unfairly excluded from the network. Our approach does not
face the restrictions of RTC and RC2RL, and address the
problem of CRL distribution.
Short-lived certificates is a technique that was proposed
to allow for implicit revocation. A short-lived certificate is
issued to every node e.g. every day. vehicles regularly ac-
quire proofs that their credentials remain valid. Instead of
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requiring them to download revocation information, vehi-
cles download verifiers from the CA. These verifiers are then
included when the certificate is presented to other nodes [9].
This approach however, incurs considerable certificate issu-
ing costs and requires vehicles to maintain a rigid contact
schedule with the CA.
Beyond VC systems, the idea of revocation appeared in
the context of mobile ad hoc networks [13]. However, this
scheme considers the instantiation of the CA and not the
problem of revocation, especially in the highly mobile VC
environment. On the other hand, impromptu coalitions of
network nodes (e.g., [3,8]) cannot be applicable in VC sys-
tems either. In fact, it would be unacceptable to allow to
any small subset of adversarial nodes to maliciously accuse
and evict legitimate nodes.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
We first discuss the resilience of our scheme. It turns out
that the simplicity of the design leaves little space for abuse,
even without authentication of the RSUs. CRL pieces are
protected (singed by the CA), and the adversary cannot in-
ject any forged pieces and delay the reconstruction of the
CRL, or replay pieces of an older or foreign CRL, as those
would be promptly detected and ignored. On the other
hand, a rogue RSU cannot abuse the system either: it can
at most avoid broadcasting CRL pieces or transmit them
a high rate, causing interference and eventually jamming
communications within its range. But this misbehavior
would be possible independently of any CRL distribution
scheme.
Elaboration of the scheme for special cases of users (and
thus their vehicles), such as those that frequently traverse
a border across which they work, or users and thus vehicles
registered with a CA with a small, geographically, region,
and detailed performance evaluation of the FC functionality
would be an interesting direction of future work. Another
interesting topic would be to investigate whether a separa-
tion of the CRL of a CA into a small number of sub-CRLs,
one for a different class of vehicles or RSUs registered with
the CA, could yield performance gains.
In conclusion, we investigated the problem of CRL distri-
bution in VC systems, which to the best of our knowledge
is the first work on this topic. We show how, with very
low bandwidth used for CRL transmissions, and a simple
and robust design, practically all vehicles can obtain the
latest CRL within a delay of 30 or 40 minutes of drive, e.g.,
the duration of a commute. Our analysis and simulations
show the trade-offs and how the system can be configured
to reduce the delivery delay if needed.
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